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The last decade has outlined corporate governance as a key factor for the 
development of economy and society. Mistakes made of the companies identified a number of 
measures to improve practices in corporate governance. Originated as an internal matter, 
corporate governance has become a leading item on the agenda of external analysts. 
The relationships "principal-agent" has led to overlapping of interests between them 
to reporting short-term profit. Despite the existence of external players in corporate governance, 
internal problems infiltrated and took over from the external environment. Actions taken to 
improve corporate governance practices affect all participants: shareholders, managers, auditors 
and regulators.  
The modern Corporate Governance projects mark the biggest changes in the 
practices of boards. The institutional pressure and updated requirements of stakeholders led to 
the evolution in practices to revolution [10, 1]. The national traditions account for the greater 
dynamism to the convergence of the practices of boards: composition of the board, fold level of 
stakeholder engagement and risk management. External factors have combined effect by 
requiring for increased transparency to the management practices and active regulatory 
environment. 
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The board is one of the most important mechanisms in modern companies. Setting 
practices on board is of particular importance for the development of the company due to the 
deployment of rights for decision making and the responsibility for decisions.  
In corporate governance the boards perform a dual role. On the one hand, to protect 
the interests of company, the boards carry out a control on executive management. On the other 
hand, they carry out a representative function between the company and its external environment 
[7, 55].  
 
The importance of corporate boards reflected in a wide academic literature and in the 
focus of supervisors. Due to data availability and comparability, the majority of the literature on 
the boards is focused on research for US companies. The diversity of practices on board in the 
EU is particularly important because many of the regulatory proposals emerged at the beginning 
of the crisis to change the practices of European boards. The most ambitious proposals are aimed 
at reforming the boards of financial intermediaries because of their importance to the 
development of economy and society.  
 
The corporate governance practices are varied at macro level as well as individual 
countries differ in territorial organisation, standard of living, political and economic history. In 
economic development boards become participants in corporate governance due to the transfer 
of control rights from the state of shareholders. The change in shareholder liability from 
unlimited to limited gives them a reason to participate in the selection of the composition and 
practices of boards. The first boards are necessarily included only shareholders of the company – 
the composition is reflected by the ratio between majority shareholders. The historical dynamics 
of corporate governance professionalise the activities of the boards, which is outsourced for a 
limited period - one year for the Anglo-Saxon countries and five years for continental countries. 
In the late Middle Ages in Europe have imposed practices for collective 
management. It included a representative body for public institutions - city councils, parliaments, 
professional guilds, church [6, 32]. For members of the representative body were chosen socially 
significant persons with large public authority.  
  
The first corporate structures of the sixteenth century (shipping guilds, commercial 
banks and some forms of monopoly for carrying out of foreign trade) did not include boards and 
managed by managers called governors. They have rights beyond current notions of managers, 
incl. diplomatic immunity and some tax powers. Their appointment has been made by decree of 
overlord (octroi de licence). Their functions were limited to determining the commercial 
networks for sailing and supplies. 
The Industrial Revolution (XVIII c.) changes the practices on board due to expansion 
of activities of the companies. The family property provides the management outside from the 
family parties, most have been elected officials with the greatest experience in the company. The 
control over the managers is carried out by the family board or by professional guilds, which can 
be considered as the forerunner of two-tier system.  
At the end of the nineteenth century, in the railway companies established one-tier 
system. For effective management of the property were appointed proven industrialists and 
traders. The control was exercised over the board by person, authorized by the State, to comply 
with the fiscal discipline. The history notes a conflict between the interests of an individual 
company and the interests of society. Began appointment of a supervisory body, often called the 
"Committee", for advising the board in making the decision and review the documentation and 
real property.  
Since 1861 the state policy of Germany competition with France and England 
approved a two-tier system. It includes a management board, composed of industrialists, and 
supervisory board, which includes representatives of state bodies, controlling shareholders and 
lending banks. The function of the state as a monitor over the companies is transferred to the 
supervisory board, which in 1937 began to recruit board members instead of the general meeting 
of shareholders.  
 
In Bulgarian history corporate boards marked his start of the first Commercial Law 
(1897 г.). The only system of two-tier management was: general meeting of shareholders, the 
examiner board and management board. The participation of the majority shareholders in 
management boards are made on a proportional basis on the grounds of greater engagement in 
  
managing. In rare cases, minority shareholders appeared as board members, mainly because of 
their expert skills.  
In the recent history of Bulgaria, the Commercial Law (1991) allows the French 
system: a choice between one-tier and two-tier system. Currently thirteen Member States have 
adopted the French system: Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and Slovenia. The preference for a one-
tier or two-tier system does not increase the composition of the board - EU companies with two-
tier structure have an average of 9 members (the Netherlands) to 14 members (Germany), which 
is not higher than the one-tier system in the US [4, 199]. 
 
Corporate boards play a key role in corporate governance and are therefore regulated 
by company law and corporate governance codes [3]. Notwithstanding the general basis for the 
rules of the board, remain significant differences. They arise from the structure of shareholder 
composition; the historical, political and social development; the presentation of staff in the 
board. With the emergence of the movement toward corporate governance codes, there is a clear 
trend towards convergence of minimum requirements for boards. 
In Bulgaria, as in most countries in Eastern Europe are used different practices of 
corporate boards. The diversity is determined by historical and legal heritage, and the choice 
made during the transitional period [7, 55]. The main factors in determining the type of board 
practices are: 
- Nationality of the capital. In companies with foreign capital is applied two-tier 
system, with a view to protecting the interests of shareholders to solve the agent conflict. In 
practice this case refers to subsidiaries of financial intermediaries Companies with Bulgarian 
capital apply one-tier system. 
- Mode of occurrence. For holding groups and privatized companies in which 
dependence on the historical development (path dependence) is large, apply two-tier system. 
Practices in start-ups indicate a one-tyre system.  
- Status of the company. Modern preferences are for switching to one-tyre system 
for companies coming out of the stock exchange. The listing leads to replacement of the 
  
supervisory board by the stock exchange and related financial analysts in the exercise of control 
functions. 75% of public companies in Bulgaria have adopted a one-tier system because the 
better option for the appointment and dismissal of the CEO [13].  
- Size and scope of activity. Companies with diversified products and wide 
geographical coverage implement two-tier system. On the other hand, companies with limited 
scope and activities apply one-tier system. It should be referred and sector of activity: in 
financial intermediation system is two-tyre system, while companies in the real sector – one-tier 
system.  
 
The modern practice at international level respects two processes - convergence and 
divergence. Convergence of practices conducted in respect of the board, while shareholders 
retain practices according to the shareholder structure. Convergence in practices of boards in the 
EU is due to the pressure of competition, the support of governments and institutional investors. 
The convergence is evident in the national codes on corporate governance than in the statutes of 
companies. 
The practices of boards in the EU have made some harmonization, but there are still 
gaps in terms of [1, 5]: 
– ratio of the number of outside directors in the board; 
– independence of the chairman of the committees with supervision functions; 
– requirements for education and experience of the chairman of the board; 
– rights for the nomination of managers [5, vii];  
– participation of employee in decision making.  
 
Prospects for the practices of boards in Bulgaria are consistent with those in the EU: 
- Strengthen on the obligation for reporting by the boards. After Bulgaria's full 
membership in the EU, the practices of the boards are reported in Global Competitiveness 
Report. The World Economic Forum examined the effectiveness of corporate boards as reporting 
of managers to the board and shareholders. For the past six years the indicator for Bulgaria has 
dropped from 96th position (2008) [9, 119] to 127th position (2013) [11, 139]. The European 
  
Commission recommendations are to encourage the shareholders to attend general meetings and 
exercise their voting rights wisely for control over managers [2].  
- Control over executive remuneration. Should be paid more attention to the role of 
institutional investors for giving statements on issues related to salaries. The aim is to reduce the 
"risk appetite" for short-term results and managers to be materially interested in the future of the 
company.  
In many countries, the ability of the board to monitor effectively the remuneration of 
executive directors, recommended by the Corporate Governance Principles of the OECD, is a 
key change in practice and remains one of the central elements of the debate on corporate 
governance [8, 7]. The nature of this challenge goes beyond the level of remuneration of the 
executive members and directors, because that is the focus of more political discourse, to orient 
how the remuneration commitments and motives they harmonize with the long-term interests of 
the company. 
- Number of non-executive members to the supervisory board/board of directors. 
The independence of the board (the ratio of directors designated as independent non-executive 
directors) has increased in both the EU and the US, but levels of independence are higher in the 
US (74%) than in the EU (34 %) [4, 192]. Variations in the size of the board are dictated by 
company size and industry classification. Small companies reduce both board size and 
independence of board. Such changes are related to companies with weak results that change 
their board to increase the focus and improve its expertise. 
For Bulgaria the number of executive members is provided in the requirements of the 
law to public companies only. They at least 1/3 of the members of the supervisory board/board 
of directors must be independent members.  
- Establishment of committees with control functions. The European Commission 
recommendations are to complement national codes with three key committees: nomination 
committee, remuneration committee and audit committee. Audit committees are required by law 
for companies that operate in the public interest. In Bulgaria, through legislation, only 
commercial banks and insurance companies are required presence of audit committee and 
remuneration committee.  
- Participation of employees in the company's management. For example, in 
Germany through the legislative requirement is provided one of the members of the supervisory 
  
board must be elected by the employees. In Bulgaria, according to the Commerce Act, is 
provided a situation in which an employee has the opportunity to participate in the general 
meeting of shareholders in an advisory capacity.  
- Participation of minority shareholders on the board. It is achieved by nominating 
a member of the supervisory board/board of directors of minority shareholders. Thus enabling to 
protect the rights and interests of minority shareholders.  
- Diversification of the composition of the boards by profession, nationality and 
gender. While markets become transnational, their management structures remain national. A 
greater diversity of board members will improve the quality of debates and processes of 
decision-making. 
– Separation of the functions of chairman and CEO. In Bulgaria, the regulatory 
requirements for separating the functions of chairman of the board and CEO have been 
introduced for insurance and pension companies only [12, 6].  
– Active participation of institutional investors. It includes large shareholders to 
publish their voting policy. This means controlling shareholders to clearly indicate whether profit 
oriented or social interests.  
 
* * * 
 
The practices of corporate boards determine the level of development of market 
principles and the level of convergence. The modern trends mark a convergence of practices in 
terms of accountability of the board to shareholders and to stakeholders.  
Bulgarian law trends in the EU, taking into account the degree of implementation of 
best practices. The biggest changes and convergence towards the European practices is at the 
boards of financial intermediaries - companies with cross-border operations and foreign 
ownership. 
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